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From 1958 to 2021, fertility rates in the United States have declined from 3.5 births per
woman to 1.8 births per woman (macrotrends). Declining fertility is a common trend in
developed countries, specifically for countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD). Fertility is crucial to workforce replacement, so declining fertility
rates have a direct impact on GDP. In the United States, the working-age population growth rate
has fallen below the total population growth rate. Workforce replacement is the ratio of
working-age people entering the workforce to retired age people exiting the workforce. This
paper studies the relationship between the rising costs of children and fertility rates. Economists
have agreed that individual demand for children responds no differently to an increase in costs
than any other market commodity; as price increases, demand decreases. Children also fit the
definition of a normal good as established by Thomas Malthus’ theory of fertility. Higher female
educational attainment and employment rates in the developed world have resulted in an
increased opportunity cost of having children for women. Higher opportunity costs for women
combined with high monetary costs of private childcare causes an economic constriction on the
demand for children. The literature demonstrates that government intervention can correct the
market failure of private childcare in the United States to alleviate the costs of children.
The labor force participation rate and educational attainment in OECD countries for
prime-age women have increased in the past century, resulting in a delay in childbearing, and an
initial decline in fertility. In the early 20th century, the role of a woman was as a mother and
caretaker of the home. Families, therefore, incurred no monetary costs of childcare, because
women were traditionally expected to perform free household labor. As women began to enter
higher education and thereafter the workforce, career advancement became the best-foregone
alternative to having children. Further, into the 20th century, women began to independently
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establish themselves economically before marrying. More women were making the decision to
pursue careers rather than solely pursuing the goal of marriage and then family life. The
opportunity cost of having children increased significantly for women, as taking time off to have
a child results in a decrease in pay and other negative consequences for potential career
advancement. At every degree level, women experience a decrease in earnings to take an
18-month break to raise a child: “a decrease in earnings of 41 percent for those with an MBA, 29
percent for those with a JD or a Ph.D., and 15 percent for those with an MD '' (US Treasury). A
study in the UK demonstrating the foregone potential earnings of women who have children
found that “Between the 'typical' mother's 17th and 60th birthdays [gross earnings] amount to
163,000 euros. Her total potential earnings had she not had children amount to 285,000 euros”
(Joshi 1990). In the past century, the full cost of having a child has become, “the sum of an actual
outlay (net of any child subsidy or tax allowance) and an opportunity cost (net of any income
tax)” (Barmby and Cigno 1990). The opportunity cost of having children can be quantified in
forgone earnings as Joshi demonstrated in 1990. Because women were not previously expected
to have a salary, the introduction to forgone earnings is a cost only to the mother. While
opportunities for women have increased educational attainment and career advancements, costs
have increased in the family sphere. The literature has insofar demonstrated that women
potentially face massive career tradeoffs to raise a child. As we will now discuss, women are
choosing to delay having children to mitigate the effects on career, but there are associated costs
to fertility rate and childbearing recuperation.
Delaying marriage to pursue careers that provide economic independence, concurrently
results in a delay in childbearing, and women can't recover fertility later in life, as they are more
likely to have fewer children if they choose to give birth after their prime age. OECD data has
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demonstrated that “more educated women have fewer children than less educated ones in all
countries and years considered” (d’Addio and d’Ercole 2005). Education is not the determinant
factor in this statistic but it is rather the portion of a woman's prime childbearing years that
education takes up. An elongated period of education results in an increase in “the mean age of
women at first childbirth and reduce[s] the number of years in which they can have additional
children” (d’Addio and d’Ercole 2005). Delayed childbearing means that “completed fertility is
unlikely to return to replacement levels in most OECD countries” (d’Addio and d’Ercole 2005).
In addition to a lack of recuperation, women in their 30s and 40s face greater health risks to
themselves and their children, increasing the costs of childbearing in terms of health. These
challenges, not carried by male partners or fathers, have created a unique dilemma for fertility. In
the past, the role of a woman within the family dynamic was to care for and raise children, but
with a shifting cultural dynamic, disconnecting the female wage from the costs of children is
pivotal to recuperating fertility.
While the correlation between female labor force participation rates (FPR) and total
fertility rates (TFR) was distinctly negative before the 1970s, data from OECD countries from
1970-1995 demonstrated a reversal of that trend, as a result of strong childcare alternatives. The
negative correlation between FPR and TFR was around -0.5 during the 1970s and rose to a
positive correlation of 0.5 in the 1990s (Ahn and Mira 2002). A shift from personal child care to
private childcare occurred as a result of women moving away from the responsibility of in-home
unpaid childcare labor, and entering the workforce at higher rates. As more mothers chose to
outsource childcare to the private industry, both TFR and FPR were positively supported “mainly
due to more use of market child care and the rising income effect of wages at high levels of the
female wage” (Ahn and Mira 2002). The reversal of this trend is strongly demonstrated by the

O’Neill 4

empirical change in child care spending which between 1970 and 2010 in the United States,
“increased by a factor of 21-or approximately 2,000 percent- in those 40 years.” (Thompson
2019). As childcare becomes an alternative to a mother’s unpaid labor, it facilitates an increase in
wages for women, which in recent years has been correlated with an increase in fertility. In the
past few decades, women have become an established portion of the workforce, and their income
contributes to the financial stability of family decisions. Based on the assumption that children
are a normal good when the financial capabilities of a family increase they are likely to increase
their demand for children. Despite the positive reversal of this trend, the current quality of
childcare in the United States is not sustainable in supporting both total fertility rates and female
participation rates.
The extensive positive externalities of high-quality child care are not reflected in the
market price and therefore result in an under allocation of resources, producing an inefficient
market outcome. A positive externality is when a third party receives a benefit from a good or
service that they did not invest capital in. In terms of childcare, society as a whole benefits from
the positive effects of high-quality childcare on toddlers; quality childcare “Should at a minimum
meet children’s social, cognitive, physical, and emotional needs” (Harbach 2015). Data has
shown that individuals who experienced high-quality care “are less likely to require remedial
education, more likely to graduate from high school, less likely to commit crimes, less likely to
be neglected or abused, less likely to be unemployed, less likely to require public assistance, less
likely to become teen parents, and are generally healthier” (Harbach 2015). By staying healthier
and less likely to commit crimes, children who experience high-quality care impose fewer
burdens on enforcement agencies and the healthcare system. Unfortunately, the private market
does not take into consideration these “spillover effects” and therefore the costs associated with
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private childcare do not accurately reflect the benefits of the services provided. Because private
childcare prices are already so high as, “The average cost of a full-time child-care program in the
U.S. is now $16,000 a year,” it is not even remotely possible for the private market to include
positive externalities in the market price, as most parents struggle to pay for the service as it
currently is. The literature does not argue for the private market to correct and offer the service at
a higher price, but rather it seeks for the government to intervene to make childcare more
affordable, and positive externalities are a strong rationale for government action. A lack of
knowledge, among parents choosing childcare options, creates information problems, another
aspect of market failure that encourages government intervention.
Information problems have caused a lower than optimal demand for quality childcare,
resulting in a market that is not obligated to produce it. Adam Smith’s “Invisible Hand” theorem
generally dictates that self-interested buyers and sellers will produce market outcomes that are
socially optimal and produce no waste. In the case of childcare, self-interested parents lack all of
the information necessary to make adequate decisions about what to purchase and demand. Due
to all of the positive externalities of child care, families would need to consider the spillovers to
all of society to create a socially optimal market price without government intervention, “Yet
families consider only the private, internal benefits of childcare in determining their willingness
to pay” (Harbach 2015). Asymmetrical information drives down the quality of childcare that is
produced by the private market. Because private childcare is acting as an alternative to free labor
by mothers or other family members, the biggest factor parents take into consideration is
quantity, or how many hours per day a childcare facility is capable of providing. This emphasis
on quantity results in quality tradeoffs that ignores the importance of high emotional and
cognitive stimulation for infants and toddlers. Parents won’t demand higher quality care because
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they do not have all the information necessary to do so, which enables child-care providers to
continue producing a lower quality of care.
High private costs of children have resulted in a lower fertility rate, and government
intervention in the childcare market is required to ensure workforce replacement. To support the
high costs of childcare the government should implement a subsidy that is equivalent to the
marginal external benefit that high-quality childcare generates for society. The government will
receive the costs of subsidies back in the long term as, “In 2015, the Council of Economic
Advisors wrote that every $1 spent on early-childhood education results in roughly $8.60 of
societal benefits” (Thompson 2019). This will alleviate both information asymmetry and the
overall quality of childcare that the market produces. In the United States, individual states have
begun to introduce childcare subsidies with positive results in increasing financial security and
maintaining maternal employment. For example, “$1,000 higher annual state subsidy spending
per low-income child led to a 3.5 percentage point increase in the likelihood of maternal
employment,” demonstrating a distancing between the cost of children and FPR (Prenatal Policy
Impact Center). Subsidies also increase a family's economic security as a “Subsidy receipt led to
an increase in monthly earnings by 250%” (Prenatal Policy Impact Center) which helps increase
the demand for children as families have more capital to spend. In addition to subsidies that help
account for positive externalities, quality regulations must be imposed to drive out low-quality
childcare. Imposing quality regulations will also alleviate information asymmetry, as parents will
not bear the burden of understanding the standards of quality childcare, as businesses will
already be required to meet them.
A couple's decision to not have children, or delay childbearing, is bad behavior. Countries
like Japan have faced major hits to their GDP as an aging population was failed to be replaced by
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new generations. Countries in the developed world must find solutions to prevent economic
decline due to a lack of workforce replacement. The increased costs of children in the past
century have caused a decline in the number of children per family as well as a delay in the time
period in which women choose to have children. Rising engagement in higher education and
labor force participation increases the opportunity cost of having children for women. Market
failure in the private market for childcare services is unsuccessful at alleviating time costs due to
liquidity restraints on families and the inability of the private market to supply childcare at an
affordable and consistent rate. Government intervention in the private childcare market is
justified by this market failure as well as the positive externalities of high-quality childcare. The
decline in fertility is caused by rising costs of children, and because fertility impacts workforce
replacement, government intervention is necessary to mitigate this negative trend.
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